Port Lavna: billions turned to dust

By: Maksim Privin

Alena Alekseeva, investigator at Arctida

Raya Levashova, climate and environment analyst at Arctida

Port Lavna was conceived as one of the key elements of the Murmansk Transport Hub. The new deep-water, ice-free port was intended to redirect Russian coal exports away from the Baltic route toward northern shipping corridors and create additional opportunities for supplies to Asia and India.

But by the time the project was launched, the economic and geopolitical situation had changed dramatically. Following the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European markets began closing to Russian coal producers, exports declined, logistics became more complicated, and private investor interest in Lavna noticeably weakened. A project once contested by Russia’s largest coal companies ultimately had to be completed through state loans, subsidies, and concession schemes.

Arctida and Chronicles.Media examined in detail who initiated Murmansk’s “construction project of the century,” the environmental risks posed by the port, and who profited from its multi-billion-ruble contracts.

Lavna without cargo

Port Lavna is designed to handle 18 million tonnes of coal annually. In January 2026, the general contractor reported that throughput capacity had reached approximately 12 million tonnes, or 67% of the planned level.

The problem, however, is that Lavna currently lacks sufficient cargo volumes. In 2025, the terminal shipped only around 1 million tonnes of coal. On the eastern shore of Kola Bay, coal transshipment volumes at the Murmansk Commercial Sea Port have been declining for two consecutive years. In the first quarter of 2026, throughput fell by 39% compared with 2025 and by roughly 60% compared with the 2020 peak.

In other words, the port was built for growing coal exports, but by the time it became operational it encountered a sharp decline in demand and a transformed logistics environment. In 2016, construction of the Murmansk Transport Hub facilities had effectively been frozen because of a lack of economic viability. Now the same problem has returned, but only after multi-billion-ruble investments had already been made.

According to media reports, the main construction contractor for Lavna, TEK Mosenergo, has faced difficulties settling payments with subcontractors. An equally complicated situation has developed around the Vykhodnoy–Lavna railway branch line.

Additional questions about the project emerged following an audit by the Accounts Chamber. Auditors identified financial irregularities in the implementation of the Comprehensive Development of the Murmansk Transport Hub project by the directorate of the state customer, Russian Transport Modernisation agency (Rostransmodernizatsiya).

Why Port Lavna was built 

The idea of constructing a coal terminal on the western shore of Kola Bay first emerged in the mid-2000s. In 2006, the Siberian Business Union announced plans to build a port with a capacity of at least 15 million tonnes of coal per year. The project was later incorporated into the state transport development program and became part of the Murmansk Transport Hub.

The logic behind the project was straightforward. Authorities planned to eliminate open coal transshipment within Murmansk’s urban area and replace it with a modern terminal located outside densely populated residential districts. In Murmansk itself, coal handling had for years been one of the city’s major environmental problems. Residents complained about coal dust settling on homes, cars, and snow, and contaminating the air. Protests against open coal transshipment became an important part of the local public agenda.

Lavna was promoted precisely as a technologically advanced and supposedly more environmentally friendly alternative. The terminal is located not in the city center, but on the opposite shore of Kola Bay from Murmansk. Around 2.5 kilometres of open space separate the port from residential areas. Railcar unloading is designed to take place inside enclosed buildings, coal is transported via covered conveyor systems, and certain stages use aspiration and dust-suppression systems. In theory, these measures were expected to help improve air quality in the city, although they are unlikely to eliminate the coal dust problem entirely.

Enclosed transshipment, open storage 

The main environmental criticism of Lavna concerns not so much the unloading systems or conveyor lines as the open-air storage of coal. The terminal’s coal stockpiles are not contained in sealed silos. Instead, they are stored on open yards surrounded by perforated wind screens 18 metres high, while the maximum height of the coal piles themselves reaches 16 metres.

Formally, this is classified as a protective system, but in practice the screens rise only two metres above the coal mass itself.

The Murmansk coast regularly experiences winds exceeding 25 metres per second, while maximum gusts can reach 40 metres per second and higher. Average wind speed in Murmansk exceeds 4 metres per second for most of the year, whereas fine particles from dusty surfaces can become airborne at speeds of just 3–5 metres per second. Under northern winds, dust from the western shore of Kola Bay may spread toward Murmansk’s Pervomaysky District, including the neighbourhoods of Abram-Mys, Drovyanoye, and Tri Ruchya.

Even closer to the terminal are the small settlements of Mishukovo and Mezhdurechye. The boundary of the project site is located approximately 500 metres from residential buildings in Mishukovo. Formally, the sanitary protection zone complies with regulations, but in practice residents live in immediate proximity to coal stockpiles, railway infrastructure, and operating port equipment, creating potential health risks.

Dust in the lungs and the climate crisis 

Coal dust is not merely dirt. Scientific research identifies it as a source of toxic trace elements and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons. Some of these compounds may have carcinogenic, mutagenic, and teratogenic properties.

Particles measuring between 2.5 and 10 microns are considered especially dangerous. They can penetrate deep into the respiratory tract and reach the lungs, where they may settle and damage tissue. Coal dust also contaminates soils, surface water, and groundwater, and its impact may be particularly severe in Arctic ecosystems because of the fragility of the natural environment.

The environmental impact assessment materials for Lavna list multiple sources of air pollution associated with terminal operations: coal transshipment, accumulation, storage, crushing and sorting, the operation of locomotives, tugboats and vessels, wastewater treatment facilities, repair zones, and fueling infrastructure. Potential emissions identified in the documentation include coal dust, nitrogen oxides, soot, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, benzo[a]pyrene, formaldehyde, kerosene, and other substances.

Although the project includes watering systems, aspiration equipment, enclosed conveyor systems, and wastewater treatment facilities, some risks remain even with these technologies in place — particularly in cases of dust suppression failures, accidents, strong winds, or increased transshipment volumes.

“Relocating coal transshipment from central Murmansk to the opposite shore of Kola Bay does not solve the pollution problem; it merely moves it from the ‘living room’ to the ‘backyard.’ Despite the enclosed transshipment system, storing millions of tonnes of coal in open-air ‘fields’ remains a source of coal dust, threatening both nature and human health. Unfortunately, no technology can completely stop its spread,” explains Raya Levashova, climate and environmental analyst at Arctida.

The analyst adds that coal remains the dirtiest and most climate-damaging fossil fuel.

Expanding projects linked to its extraction and combustion means investing in the intensification of the climate crisis and its negative consequences: heatwaves, droughts, floods, extreme precipitation, wildfires, storms, and ecosystem destruction.

“These and other effects, which we are already observing in the anomalously fast-warming Arctic, will only continue to accumulate critical mass. This means people will increasingly have to deal with losses and damages, as well as the costs of adapting to the climate crisis — costs that will require resources far exceeding the profits generated by such enterprises. At the same time, it is unlikely that major Russian infrastructure projects like Lavna will ever be prepared to acknowledge their climate responsibility or compensate for the damage caused,” says Raya Levashova.

Risks to the Arctic environment 

The terminal is located within the Kola Bay area. Nearby are the Bolshaya Lavna and Malaya Lavna rivers, oxbow lakes, and wetland areas. Part of the port territory lies within a protected water zone, which requires special measures to prevent pollution, contamination, and depletion of water bodies.

The project documentation also identifies risks to surface waters. The materials discuss pollution from suspended mineral particles during construction and dredging operations, possible oil spills, the discharge of treated wastewater, increased water turbidity, and damage to aquatic biological resources.

The nearest specially protected natural area called “Ram's Forehead Rock near Lake Semyonovskoye” is located just 4.5 kilometres from the site. The region also includes the Kandalaksha Nature Reserve, which encompasses marine areas of the White and Barents Seas. The nearest marine protected zones of the reserve within Kola Bay are situated approximately 15 kilometres from the terminal berths.

Formally, the project developers maintain that there will be no significant impact on protected natural areas. However, coal bulk carriers pass through the waters of Kola Bay, creating additional risks ranging from noise pollution to fuel leaks and the transport of fine coal dust particles by marine currents.

Coal dust also contributes to the melting of ice and snow cover by disrupting albedo, the Earth’s reflectivity.

Dark dust particles reduce the ability of light surfaces to reflect heat, contributing to additional Arctic warming.

Thus, beyond polluting the environment and negatively affecting ecosystems and human health, coal dust may also accelerate snowmelt, increasing wildfire risks and extending the fire season.

How a private port became a state project 

In its early stages, Lavna was attractive to private investors. Over the years, the project drew interest from the Siberian Business Union, business structures linked to billionaires Iskander Makhmudov and Andrey Bokarev, as well as the Swiss trader Mercuria Energy Trading.

From 2009 onward, the project was controlled by Makhmudov and Bokarev through the Rozana company, which owned Sea Commercial Port Lavna LLC (SCP Lavna). In 2016, however, Makhmudov decided to withdraw from the project. The official explanation was the rising construction cost following the ruble devaluation. It was then that concerns about the lack of sufficient cargo volumes were publicly raised for the first time. The estimated cost of the project increased from 17.6 billion rubles to 40–50 billion rubles.

Most of Makhmudov’s stake was sold to GTLK – State Transport Leasing, a joint-stock company wholly owned by the Russian Federation. According to financial documents, the stake was transferred for $11.28 million, while claims on loans issued by Makhmudov to SCP Lavna were sold for 484.7 million rubles. After the transaction, the billionaire’s structures retained only a 5% stake in Rozana, and the investment itself was later recognized as impaired.

Soon afterward, however, former project participants attempted to regain control over Lavna. In 2017, GTLK reached an agreement with Mercuria Energy Trading, which sought to acquire a 75% stake in the terminal. The deal failed to receive approval from the Federal Antimonopoly Service. At the same time, structures linked to Andrey Bokarev applied to acquire 70% of Lavna and received preliminary approval. This move was opposed by SDS-Ugol, which feared the strengthening of Bokarev’s position in the northwestern port sector.

A compromise was ultimately reached: Bokarev’s Businessglobus received 20%, SDS 25%, RZD – Russian Railways 10%, while another 30% went to the newly established Port Infrastructure Development Center (CRPI), a joint-stock company founded by the little-known lawyer Boris Guttsov. This structure would later become the project’s principal owner and logistics coordinator.

In 2018, the government formalized the project through a concession agreement under which the concession fee paid to the state was purely symbolic (just one thousand rubles) while the state committed itself to financing access infrastructure, ensuring operating conditions for the port operator, and allowing the collection of special port fees.

The terms were later rewritten several times. In 2022, the concession period was extended until 2043, while the payment schedule for the concedent, the Russian Federation, was simultaneously removed from the list of “core conditions.” Construction deadlines were subsequently postponed again in 2024 and 2025. In December 2025, the government officially approved a two-stage completion plan for the terminal: by December 2025 it would be sufficient to reach throughput capacity of up to 9 million tonnes of coal annually, while the target of 18 million tonnes was postponed until May 2027.

Although direct state payments were removed from the government order regulating the concession agreement, part of the costs was still assumed by state-controlled entities, including the GTLK. Thus, an arbitration court ruling in one of the disputes concerning the supply and installation of equipment revealed that GTLK invested 27.7 billion rubles in the procurement of technological equipment.

“Friendly” contractors for the "project of the century”

By 2021, the project had been effectively reassembled. The main construction contracts went to companies linked with billionaires Arkady Rotenberg and Igor Rotenberg, long-time associates of Vladimir Putin.

The principal construction contract was awarded to JSC TEK Mosenergo, 78.7% of which is owned by the Rotenberg-linked National Project Construction Group (Natsproektstroy). TEK Mosenergo CEO Alexey Krapivin is also associated with the 1520 Group, the largest contractor of Russian Railways (RZD). His father, Andrey Krapivin, served as an adviser to former RZD head Vladimir Yakunin, one of the shareholders of the Ozero dacha cooperative, of which Vladimir Putin was also a member.

Another contractor was NPS Engineering, likewise linked to the Rotenberg-controlled Natsproektstroy group. According to the financial data of SCP Lavna, out of 23 billion rubles allocated directly to construction, 19.7 billion went to TEK Mosenergo and 1.4 billion to NPS Engineering. Thus, approximately 21.1 billion rubles from the construction budget went to two contractors connected to the Rotenberg network.

However, the broader structure of spending from state-backed credit funds looked very different. Of the nearly 80 billion rubles in state investments, those same 23 billion were spent on construction, 17 billion went toward repayments to banks, and another approximately 34 billion toward refinancing.

Thus, little more than a quarter of the allocated funds was spent on actual construction work.

The 2021 restructuring of the Lavna project was reflected not only in the allocation of construction contracts, but also in the reshaping of its management structure. Key positions in the port and affiliated entities were taken by managers connected to Natsproektstroy structures and the Rotenberg circle.

For example, Stanislav Multakh, who became head of Lavna, had previously worked in structures associated with former transport minister Maxim Sokolov, himself linked to the Rotenbergs. Lavna’s first deputy CEO, Andrey Levakin, had also once worked alongside Sokolov in the St. Petersburg city government. Other port executives likewise previously worked in various Rotenberg-affiliated companies, including deputy CEO for government and public relations, Maxim Nikolaev, deputy CEO for construction Vladimir Malanin (Zaitsev), investment adviser Nadezhda Primakova, client-construction service director Timur Mukhamedzhanov, and his deputy Vladimir Parshkov.

In practice, the same network of actors receives both the money for construction and control over the project itself.

Monopoly on coal transshipment 

To ensure the port’s utilization, a system of long-term take-or-pay contracts was established. In 2021, Lavna contracted out the capacity of the future coal terminal through 2043, the year the concession expires. The contract holder was CRPI through the Moscow-based company Complex Transport and Logistics Solutions (KTLR).

In essence, CRPI assumed the obligation to pay the port for transshipment services even in the absence of actual cargo. At the same time, the company concluded mirror agreements with four coal suppliers from Kuzbass.

This arrangement formally demonstrated future utilization of the terminal and supported the project’s financial model, but it also created a transport monopoly in which CRPI secured full control over coal transshipment for decades ahead.

Today, Lavna’s actual cargo flows and logistics are concentrated around companies linked to Boris Guttsov and CRPI. By 2025, CRPI had become the owner of 95% of SPC Lavna, effectively the entire port. The remaining 5% belongs to the state-owned GTLK.

SDS, which once fought for participation in the project, sold its stake to CRPI in September 2025. The move became a symbolic conclusion: major coal industry players that were initially interested in the port no longer see the same economic value in it.

Figurehead's role at Lavna 

For a long time, Boris Guttsov remained a little-known figure, and photographs of him are still largely unavailable in the public domain. Yet it was through structures associated with him that control over Lavna’s key logistics assets was formalized.

CRPI was registered in 2018, during another reshuffling of Lavna’s ownership structure. Until 2020, the company’s sole owner was Boris Guttsov, who was 31 years old at the time. Ownership data is now concealed, but it is known that in February 2020 the sole shareholder became the closed-end mutual investment fund Infrastructure Development, managed by one of VTB Bank’s affiliated companies. Guttsov nevertheless remained on the company’s board of directors.

CRPI, in turn, controls the railway operator KTLR and the transport company SCL – Special Container Lines. KTLR serves as the coal transportation operator for Lavna. In 2024, KTLR paid the port 1.33 billion rubles for transshipment services, while the company’s revenue reached 8.25 billion rubles.

Guttsov’s biography points to connections with Russia’s managerial elite. He began his career at the modest law firm Antonova & Partners. One of his colleagues there was Anton Ulanov, who in recent years headed several companies within the Kolmar holding of Anna Tsivileva and Sergey Tsivilev, the niece of Vladimir Putin and her husband.

In the mid-2010s, Guttsov worked with fugitive Ukrainian oligarch and media magnate Sergei Kurchenko, once known as Ukraine’s “gas king.” After Kurchenko relocated to Russia, a nominal stake in the Russian segment of his media holding United Media Holdings (TN-Stolitsa) was registered in the name of lawyer Boris Guttsov. Guttsov was also mentioned as Kurchenko’s lawyer in an Al Jazeera investigation into the trade of frozen assets belonging to former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, in which Kurchenko was involved. In 2016, Boris Guttsov participated in litigation in a New York court between Sergey Kurchenko’s United Media Holdings and Forbes magazine.

A turning point in Guttsov’s career came through his association with Alexey Taycher, a former adviser to RZD head Oleg Belozerov and former co-owner of the major leasing companies Transfin-M and SG-Trans. In 2023, Guttsov and Taycher traveled together several times to Istanbul and Dubai. They were accompanied by another former CEO for CRPI, Evgeny Prilepin, who had previously worked with Taycher at RZD and the Federal Freight Company (FGC).

The Port Infrastructure Development Center created by Boris Guttsov pledged a stake in its subsidiary Special Container Lines as collateral to the leasing company Transfin-M, which at the time was controlled by Alexey Taycher.

Another former CEO or CRPI, Maxim Anishchenkov, was also connected to Taycher’s structures, having previously headed Transfin-M.

It may therefore be assumed that Alexey Taycher is the actual figure behind the Port Infrastructure Development Center, which effectively owns Port Lavna, while Boris Guttsov functions merely as a hired lawyer and nominal owner.

Alexey Taycher twice appeared in Forbes rankings of Russians receiving the largest dividend payouts: he was 7th in 2023 with 51.5 billion rubles and 14th in 2024 with 37 billion rubles.

In June 2024, Alexey Taycher was detained on suspicion of fraud. In spring 2025, the Prosecutor General’s Office secured a court ruling transferring a number of transport companies co-owned by Taycher into state ownership. In April 2026, the billionaire was sentenced to 11 years in prison for fraud involving 1.2 billion rubles.

Project with no obvious benefits 

Officially, Lavna is presented as a strategic infrastructure project intended to strengthen Russia’s export potential, develop the Northern Sea Route, and reduce the environmental burden on Murmansk. Compared with open bucket coal transshipment within the city, conditions for Murmansk residents may indeed improve.

But this does not mean Lavna solves the problem. Rather, the problem has been moved from the “living room” to the backyard, where open-air coal storage is less visible. The terminal has become more technologically advanced, yet it remains tied to the same dirty fuel, open coal stockpiles, dust, noise, wastewater, accident risks, and pressure on the Arctic ecosystem.

The project’s economic benefits appear even more questionable. Lavna was designed for growing coal exports, but over the past 20 years the market has changed dramatically. Russia’s coal industry has spent several years in deep crisis. Some mines in Kuzbass continue operating mainly to preserve jobs, while the enterprises themselves remain unprofitable.

There is already insufficient cargo for the newly built Lavna terminal. Even the neighboring operating Murmansk port is losing volumes and is described as being “on the verge of profitability.” Lavna itself does not appear financially sustainable without state support. At the same time, public money has already been invested, contractors have absorbed billions of rubles, and logistics have become concentrated in the hands of a narrow circle of companies.

In the end, Lavna is an example of a project that began as competition among private investors for a promising asset, but became fully dependent on state financing and tied to lucrative contracts benefiting oligarchs close to the authorities.

At the same time, its advantages for the economy, local residents, and the environment are, to put it mildly, highly questionable, while its future prospects remain even more uncertain. Yet because individuals from Vladimir Putin’s inner circle continue to profit from the project, the Russian budget continues to spend money on it.