Russia on Svalbard: Long-term strategic patterns

Relations between Norway and Russia on Svalbard have to some extent been characterized by pragmatic and functional cooperation, largely because of Norwegian compliance and careful diplomacy by Oslo. Throughout the Cold War and the post-Soviet era, Norway has accumulated considerable experience in navigating the various approaches employed by Russia concerning the archipelago. 

Ever since Norway was granted sovereignty over Svalbard in 1920, the Soviet Union, and later Russia, has maintained a consistent strategic objective on the archipelago: to secure Russian influence in the area while limiting the influence of other powers, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States. For Moscow, it has been crucial to prevent Svalbard from being used in ways that might threaten Russian security interests in the Barents Sea. Ensuring access into the Atlantic Sea for the Northern Fleet has been and still is of key importance to Russia.

Bilateralization: A Russian core strategy

A central feature of Russia’s Svalbard policy has been bilateralization—seeking to engage Norway in one-on-one negotiations in matters of importance to Russia, while simultaneously preventing Norway from drawing support of allies or international bodies when negotiating with Moscow. This approach is not unique to Norway or Svalbard but rather reflects a broader Russian strategy when dealing with smaller neighboring states.

A well-known—and for Norway, highly challenging—example of bilateralization is the so-called "Svalbard Affair." In November 1944, Norwegian Foreign Minister Trygve Lie travelled to Moscow to discuss Allied military cooperation in northernmost Europe with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. Norway was in a precarious position; Red Army soldiers had recently entered Norwegian territory in the north in an effort to drive back German troops. Simultaneously, while Nazi Germany was losing ground along the Eastern Front, it still occupied most of Norway’s territory. Minister Lie was painfully aware of Norway’s dependence on Moscow’s will to act as a true ally. Molotov for his part used the opportunity to raise an entirely different issue: he boldly proposed that Norway transfer Bear Island to the Soviet Union, annul the Svalbard Treaty, and establish a joint Soviet-Norwegian administration over the rest of Svalbard. According to Molotov, the issue should be settled bilaterally, while the other signatories to the Svalbard Treaty were simply presented with the outcome. A joint administration of Svalbard, Molotov argued, would serve the security and economic interests of both the Soviet Union and Norway well. He added that Moscow needed to establish military bases on Bear Island and Spitsbergen.

The dramatic proposal was followed by secret talks between Oslo and Moscow during the winter of 1944–45, with Norway making significant efforts to accommodate Soviet interests. Ultimately, however, the Soviet Union abandoned its demands, as Cold War tensions developed. By 1947, Soviet leaders concluded that continued pressure on Norway concerning Svalbard risked further fueling East-West confrontation.

The Soviet Union thus accepted the status quo of Svalbard. Still, a sharp Soviet initiative in 1951 signaled continued discontent. The establishment of NATO's integrated military command triggered a sharp Soviet diplomatic note warning that including Svalbard within NATO’s area of responsibility would have consequences for Norway. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet leadership repeatedly forwarded various bilateral arrangements with Norway, some of which encompassed a military-strategic aspect, such as the proposal for a joint Soviet-Norwegian airport in Longyearbyen in the 1960s.

Russia’s claim to a special status on Svalbard

In addition to bilateralization, the Soviet Union and later Russia has consistently advanced arguments that Russia holds a natural special position on Svalbard. At times, these two strategies have complemented each other, with Russian proposals for bilateral agreements being justified by Moscow pointing to an alleged unique Russian presence on the archipelago. 

To a certain extent, the argument is grounded in fact: Russia remains the only country besides Norway with permanent settlements and economic activities on Svalbard. Moscow has used these realities both to disregard and to openly challenge Norwegian governance and legal authority, at times accusing Norway of discriminating against Russian interests and implementing regulations designed to limit Russia's presence on Svalbard. In the first few decades after World War II, Norway exercised restraint in asserting authority over the Soviet settlements on the archipelago. But as Norway gradually developed its administration from the 1960s onward, Soviet arguments and protests grew louder. Norway’s adoption of the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act in 2002 prompted repeated accusations of discrimination from Russia and continues to do so today.

The long-standing line of argumentation from Russia on a special position can be seen as part of a strategy to frame, restrict, and ultimately erode Norway’s ability to fully exercise its sovereignty over Svalbard. In short, Russia’s approach towards Norway on Svalbard can be summed up in one word: pressure. The level of pressure has varied over time, depending on Moscow's assessment of its security needs and the room for achieving its goals.

The current situation

In recent years, Russia’s presence and activities on Svalbard have taken on new forms, reflecting growing authoritarianism at home, intensified state-driven patriotism, and increasing repression of its own population. Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine is draining Moscow’s resources, and to maintain control and secure the stability of the regime, Russian authorities are becoming increasingly brutal. Waves of repressive legislation, military censorship, and state coercion have swept across the Russian population. The small Russian community in Barentsburg has not been spared: in March 2022, inhabitants critical of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine were promptly instructed by their employer, state company Trust Arktikugol, to keep silent.

State propaganda and staged patriotic acts related to the war have been ramped up in Russia, serving as cost-efficient tools to rally domestic support and foster enemy images in the Russian public sphere. This is also playing out in the Russian settlements on Svalbard. Victory Day parades and Immortal Regiment acts have over the last three years been organized on May 9 in Barentsburg and Pyramiden, only to be filmed and circulated to audiences in Russia as evidence of patriotism and support for Moscow’s warfare, even in the faraway Arctic. In the summer of 2023, the erection in Pyramiden of a giant Russian Orthodox cross adorned with the St. George ribbon and inaugurated with holy water by a profiled Russian bishop served a similar purpose of showcasing Russian traditional values and true Christianity in the Arctic. 

However, these state-orchestrated acts of regime loyalty in the Russian settlements on Svalbard also serve a second goal: they are demonstrations of power directed at Norway with an implicit element of subversion, testing Oslo’s tolerance and reactions. How far can Moscow go in promoting symbols of war, aggression and “Russian values” before provoking a reaction from Norway? Russian patriotic acts on Svalbard have the potential to put Norwegian authorities in a delicate position, because any attempt to regulate the Russian behavior opens up for accusations from Moscow of discrimination and violation of the principles of freedom of expression and religion. Yet, silence from Norway may allow Russia to establish symbolic leverage for future use.

This brings us to the more long-term coercive potential embedded in the staging of patriotic and religious symbols and acts on Svalbard as seen from Moscow. Can Russia manage to establish items and tools in Svalbard that, in a situation of escalating Russia-West tensions, Moscow could claim as matters requiring protection? These kinds of hybrid operations or subversive tactics—also termed as active measures or political warfare—were widely employed by Soviet intelligence during the Cold War. Over the last years, as tensions grow due to the warfare in Ukraine and Moscow’s need for enemy perceptions and narratives of Russophobia reach an unprecedented high, such behavior has been revived. While Moscow’s subversion primarily targets former Soviet republics and East Bloc states, it is increasingly directed also at Russia’s Nordic neighbors.

Subversion is a low-cost and efficient strategy that can yield significant results even with limited resources. Today, Russia’s physical presence on Svalbard is smaller than ever before. However, subversive tactics rely primarily on political and psychological tools and to a far lesser extent on material assets and actual presence.

As for mitigating such actions, the most effective way is to expose the Russian behavior clearly and publicly, identifying both the activities and the actors behind them. Doing this, we must expect Russian authorities to respond with accusations of various kinds; that is how Russian strategic communication works. Still, this should not prevent us from speaking openly about the hybrid tools and subversive strategies employed by Russia on Svalbard—quite the contrary.