The Russo-Ukrainian war's expansion into the High North poses electronic warfare challenges for NATO

For years, Russian electronic warfare (EW) techniques such as jamming and spoofing have been interfering with non-military activities in northern Norway and Finland. This was clearly evident in 2017 when Russian EW interfered with NATO exercises in the region (Trident Juncture). 

In this case, the EW signal emitted by Russia also served as ‘signaling’ to NATO its discontent with the large-scale exercise taking place near the Kola Peninsula – home to Russia’s Northern Fleet and other strategic units. Russian EW units have been on Kola for years and their activity has intensified in 2025. Recently, civilian aviation, satellite navigation, and other GPS users in Norway’s East Finnmark region have been particularly affected by Russian EW activities. These effects pose a serious threat to aviation safety as they interfere with navigation in an environment that is already challenging for flight crews. Russia’s increased EW activity in the region since late 2024 is a response to Ukrainian long-range drone attacks on the lethal, strategic weaponry Russia has based in on the Kola peninsula. Russia will likely only increase the frequency and intensity of its EW activities as long as Ukraine maintains the capability to execute significant damage to Russian assets on the peninsula as seen on the June 1st attack.

Ukrainian drone attacks

The Russo-Ukrainian War has provided many surprises in the tactics and capabilities of both belligerents since its beginning in February 2022. The most notable battlefield effect in the war has been the development of drone warfare. Ukraine initially held the drone advantage in the war and exceeded expectations in July 2024 by successfully launching a strike on Russian airbase Olenya on the Kola peninsula approximately 1800 miles from its Ukrainian origin. Due to the distance between Ukraine and Olenya airbase, the Ukrainian drones used in these attacks are likely controlled at some point by a GPS signal.

Ukraine’s targeting of Olenya was strategic. The base is located about 200 kilometers from Norway, and is used to launch strategic bombers such as the TU-22M3 to strike Ukrainian towns and infrastructure. According to a Ukrainian news outlet, Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), drones damaged a TU-22M3 in the attack. There were additional Ukrainian drone attacks on Olenya in August and September 2024, and January 2025. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) reported that drone attacks resumed in May 2025, and that Russian units shot down four Ukrainian drones on 3 May.

At the time of writing, there is a report of a significant Ukrainian drone attack on four Russian bases to include Olenya airbase, occurring on June 1st. Ukrainians reportedly launched several drones from within only 6-7 kilometers from Olenya. Considering this short range, it’s possible the drone operators simply used sight recognition as is depicted in the on-line videos seen immediately after the attack. The attack has reportedly destroyed dozens of Russian aircraft, among them Tu-95MS and TU-22M3 bombers. The attack has been confirmed by Russian officials although without the details included in Ukrainian press and social media. As the details develop, this appears to be a coordinated attack using cheap FPV drones deployed in a creative way to destroy valuable Russian strategic assets on the ground.

Russia’s drone defense

Thus far, Russia seems to have been successful in shooting down drones, and until June 1, limited significant damage to Olenya airbase and its personnel. It is possible that Ukrainian drone operators are switching from GPS to visual control due to Russia’s anti-GPS signals emanating from Kola. However, Russia has discovered a counter to this method. Russia covered its aircraft on Olenya airbase and in some cases, altered their appearance. By placing tires on top of aircraft on the ground, Russia seems to have successfully changed the aircrafts’ appearance enough to impede Ukrainian drone AI from positive target identification, (this technique was clearly visible in the June 1 attack videos). Russia’s previous success should also be attributed to its EW units on the Kola peninsula. 

Possible Russian sources of EW interference 

Russia has employed a high level of EW capabilities against Ukraine since 2014 in its initial attack into the Donbass and illegal annexation of Crimea. Russia now has over 30 EW defensive systems to counter UAVs (C-UAV), Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), radars, GPS, and other systems used for adversarial command and control. Russia has invested heavily in its EW capabilities and reportedly has an EW brigade in each of its military districts. 

In the Leningrad Military District, the Northern Fleet’s Arctic 200th Independent Motor Rifle Brigade and 61st Naval Infantry Brigade regularly direct EW signals towards Norway. Both brigades area located in Pechenga, Kola is about 55 kilometers from Norway’s Kirkenes airport, one of the locations reporting GPS interference. Therefore, Pechenga must be considered as a possible origin location of Russian EW interference that is disrupting civilian and commercial activities in the region. 

Russia does possess EW systems capable of conducting the jamming and spoofing incidents in northern Norway and Finland. At least two of these systems have also been tested in wars in Ukraine and Syria – the R-330Zh Zhitel and the Krasukha-4. The Zhitel is a mobile jammer configured on a truck/trailer platform and designed to detect and jam satellite and cellular communication. Its effective range is only 25 kilometers but can possibly be boosted by use of a relay. The Zhitel has been used in eastern Ukraine since 2014 to include possible C-UAV activities as reported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The Krasakha-4’s capabilities include neutralization of low-Earth orbit surveillance satellites and ground-based radars, at ranges between 150 to 300 kilometers, well within the distance to Kirkenes. Some experts credit a Krasukha-4 located at Khmeimim airbase (Syria) with the reported loss of Tomahawk missiles launched during the Syrian conflict. Although the Krasukha-2 and -4 are designed to neutralize airborne radar associated with missiles, one must acknowledge their possible role in EW interference based on their effective range and capability to disrupt satellite communications.

An additional system capable of civilian communication disruption in the high north is Russia’s Murmansk-BN, one of which is located on the Kola peninsula. This system is a short-wave system that intercepts and suppresses enemy signals and has an enormous effective range of 5000 kilometers, covering nearly all of Scandinavia. If the Murmansk-BN is deployed with a Krasukha variant and other systems, there is the potential for interference with communication systems, navigation and control systems of maritime vessels and aircraft. 

Recent EW impact on civilian aviation 

In mid-2024, pilots reported nearly daily interference with their GNSS while operating in the Kirkenes area. In January 2025, for the first time, GPS manipulation (spoofing) was detected within Norwegian territory. Jamming is the more commonly-known type of EW and is essentially the disruption of a targeted signal. Spoofing however, is perhaps more dangerous since it provides a ‘false’ GPS signal which provides an incorrect geographic location for the GPS user such as an aviation pilot. This has resulted in civilian aircraft pilots not using GPS upon descent into Kirkenes. 

NATO response options

While pilots have thus far overcome EW satellite interference, there appear to be few options that Norway or Finland can take that would not exacerbate tensions between the at-war Russia and the two effected NATO members. Employing NATO EW systems to the region would unnecessarily complicate the situation, especially if it led to a successful drone attack on Olenya. However, if NATO decides to counter the interference, it may have a new, viable option in the Gandalf 4. As reported on the NATO site in April 2025, the Gandalf ‘is designed to detect, classify, and locate intentional attempts to disrupt or deceive GNSS signals.’ The system was developed by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) and has completed a series of tests at the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA). The Gandalf is still undergoing testing but will focus specifically on countering jamming and spoofing. 

NATO, and the U.S. are openly committed to Arctic development and security, and thus must address the threat of Russian EW. Russia has concentrated on this capability over the last decade, forming an adversarial threat to NATO in a domain which it dominated and enjoyed freedom of operations. Russia has proven its EW proficiency in conflict. This may not reflect an outright ability to ensure anti-access, area-denial, (A2AD) overmatch to NATO capability, but it does show its ability to dominate in a regional conflict. NATO would be wise to learn from Russia’s EW gains and continue to develop such systems as the Gandalf as well as the ability to operate, at least regionally, without the use of GPS.

Regardless of the systems to be employed in a conflict with Russia in the high north, the lessons-learned from the Russo-Ukrainian war have proven that interoperability and command and control will be essential for dominating in the EW domain. This domain should be included in the creation of the future NATO Multi-Corps Land Component Command (MCLCC). The conditions are right for Norway and Finland to be at the cutting edge of this domain’s relevance in any potential conflict with Russia occurring in the high north.

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Mr. James Harvey is a former US Army Lieutenant Colonel, Foreign Area Officer focused on the former Soviet Union. He deployed to Kosovo in 2002 and to OIF in 2007-08. He served in the US Embassies in Kyiv and Moscow as well as other Russia-related assignments such as the Pentagon Joint Staff, and Russia Strategic Initiative in Stuttgart Germany. Mr. Harvey has published articles on Eurasian military, geo-political, and culture issues through the Foreign Military Studies Offices in Ft Leavenworth.