PM Støre fears Russia will deploy more nukes in the Arctic, as New START Treaty expires on February 5th

Today marks the final day of the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia. It is the end of an era that began in 1969, when Moscow and Washington D.C. first launched the SALT I negotiations.

Signed by the two presidents Obama and Medvedev in Prague 2010, and entering force on February 5, 2011, the New START Treaty limits each country to have no more than 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.  

No deal means no legal binding limits on the total number of nuclear warheads. 

If launched, such weapons can reach the adversary in approximately 30 minutes. The shortest distance to exchange doomsday weapons between Russia and the United States via space is across the Arctic. 

Russia's largest concentration of nuclear weapons is on the Kola Peninsula. Both multirole and strategic submarines of the Northern Fleet carry nuclear weapons. Many more warheads are in storages ready for deployment. 

Gadzhiyevo, a short 100 kilometres from the border with Norway, is home to the 31st Submarine Division consisting of the Delta-IV and the Borei-class ballistic carriers. Each of the submarines can carry 16 missiles and each missile can be armed with at least six warheads. The New START Treaty stipulated for joint on-site inspections, meaning U.S. experts could travel to Gadzhiyevo and count the number of warheads on the loaded missiles.

"I think this is a real and true concern," said the Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre when asked by the Barents Observer about the possibility that Russia could increase the number of nuclear warheads in the vicinity of northern Norway. 

"I regret that some of these hard won games in the international stability - arm deals - are expiring," Støre said and called for the nuclear powers to "take responsibility."

Jonas Gahr Støre was on Thursday attending the Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromsø, an annual venue that since 2007 is known for framing international cooperation among Arctic states. However, combating climate change and encouraging circumpolar science were this year overshadowed by security concerns: Russia's all-out war against Ukraine and Trump's desire to acquire Greenland. 

While the New START limited the numbers of warheads with intercontinental range, Støre emphasized the importance of also keeping eyes on tactical nuclear weapons. These are weapons attached to cruise missiles with shorter range that if launched from Russia can reach targets in Europe.

"It was on the agenda when I met the Polish foreign minister two days ago," Støre said and elaborated by revealing a story not previously known to the public: 

"When he [Radosław Sikorski] and I were foreign ministers together, some 15 years ago, we took an initiative to map the tactical nuclear weapons in our part of Europe and tried to get them into some kind of deal framework. They are spread around and contributed to the insecurity."

Russia "completely rejected" such framework deal, Støre said.

It is unknown how many tactical nuclear weapons Russia has on the Kola Peninsula. A few are likely deployed on naval cruise missiles, like the Tsirkon and Kalibr.

The Northern Fleet has three Yasen-class submarines believed to be capable of carrying such weapons: the Severodvinsk (K-573), the Kazan (K-561) and the Arkhangelsk (K-564). These are the most quiet of all Russian submarines. Lat autumn, the Barents Observer reported about the Kazan and the Arkhangelsk, both being at sea when the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford sailed outside northern Norway. 

Tensions in northern waters have with Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine increasing to levels not seen since the Cold War. 

"The Northern Fleet remains the strongest part of the Russian Navy," said Katarzyna Zysk, a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. 

Zysk is an expert on Russia's military doctrine, maritime safety and Arctic security. She believes the nuclear capabilities on the Kola Peninsula will be more importance for Moscow now as the predictability that followed the New START Treaty is gone. 

"It can stimulate more worst case planning," she said. 

"New START’s central value was not only in the numeric limits, but also in the predictable flow of notifications, data exchanges, on site inspections and other transparency mechanisms that reduced uncertainty and helped sustain predictability about the other side’s deployed forces. Once those routines end, Russia will have to plan against a US force posture that is less observed, hence higher degree of uncertainty."

As a result, the professor fears, Russia and the United States can be pushed US toward a higher alert and larger postures of nuclear weapons.

"Increasing the quality and availability of the sea based leg is clearly in Russia’s interest and cannot be excluded," Zysk explains. 

However, she underlines that this will only be a likely scenario if Moscow believes that the overall strategic environment is worsening.