Satellite imagery indicates air-defence systems redeployed from Severodvinsk
Russia has quietly stripped much of the long-range air defence protecting its most important nuclear submarine shipyards, according to satellite imagery analysed by the Barents Observer.
Russia is running short of air-defence missiles after facing repeated waves of Ukrainian drone attacks, forcing it to redeploy many of its systems from remote regions previously considered safely beyond the reach of the front line.
The move has left strategically important military facilities in northern Russia more exposed as Ukraine's long-range drone campaign reaches ever deeper into Russian territory.
Satellite imagery analysed by the Barents Observer indicates that at least two dozen mobile S-300 and S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile systems have been withdrawn from two air-defence positions protecting Severodvinsk since 2024.
The systems have most likely been redeployed to southern Russia, the Moscow region or occupied parts of Ukraine to strengthen air defences following repeated Ukrainian strikes.
The two now largely abandoned sites are the Coastal Missile Battery on Yagry Island and the Coastal Missile Defence Battalion at Mironov Hill. The latter lies about 12 kilometres south-west of the inlet leading to the Sevmash and Zvezdochka shipyards.
Sevmash is Russia's only shipyard capable of building nuclear-powered submarines, while neighbouring Zvezdochka is the country's largest facility for their repair, modernisation and refit.
An extensive air-defence network was established during the Cold War to protect the shipyards and the Belomorsk Naval Base. In the post-Soviet era, responsibility for the area has rested with the 1528th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, part of the 45th Air and Air Defence Forces Army within the Northern Fleet, now subordinated to the Leningrad Military District.
Yagry Island
The Yagry battery consists of two positions: one on the northern shore of the Northern Dvina estuary, known as Yagry North, and another a few hundred metres from Severodvinsk's urban boundary, known as Yagry Island Central.
Yagry North serves as a forward deployment site supporting the larger Yagry Island Central position. Until sometime after July 2024, it housed six surface-to-air missile launchers in combat readiness. Earlier satellite imagery identified them as S-300 systems. More recent images are less conclusive, as most of the mobile launchers were concealed beneath anti-drone netting.
Today, however, the site appears abandoned. There are no visible support vehicles, equipment or other signs of activity.
Although it is theoretically possible that some launch vehicles remain inside the garages visible in the north-eastern corner of the site, this seems unlikely. The two tower-mounted "Flap Lid" fire-control radars visible before 2025 have disappeared, as have the reserve missile canisters used to reload the launchers.
These replenishment canisters are used to transport, store and reload missiles once launch vehicles have expended their initial complement.
Yagry Island Central
The forward deployment positions at Yagry Island Central have not hosted operationally deployed S-300 or S-400 systems since the summer of 2022, the year Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Around the same time, the site's mobile fire-control radar was dismantled and removed.
Satellite imagery from 2025 shows around a dozen replenishment missile canisters still stored on a hardstanding outside one of the larger garages. It is unlikely, however, that these still contain missiles. The canisters have remained in the same position for several years, while the transport vehicles required to move them have disappeared.
What remains inside the garages is impossible to determine from publicly available imagery. Yet it seems improbable that operational launchers are being held in reserve while none are deployed in the surrounding area at a time when Russia is at war and facing mounting security challenges.
The same imagery shows three mobile launcher vehicles parked outside another garage, together with several shorter-range air-defence systems positioned elsewhere within the complex.
Mironov Hill
The second major air-defence position protecting Severodvinsk is the Coastal Missile Defence Battalion at Mironov Hill, around 12 kilometres from the shipyards and six kilometres south of the White Sea coastline.
Just 300 metres away lies the notorious Mironov Hill repository for solid radioactive waste. During the Cold War and the decades that followed, the site received radioactive scrap and contaminated materials generated during the repair and dismantling of submarine reactors.
In 2024, the Mironov Hill battalion maintained eight S-300 launch vehicles at the site, each capable of carrying four missiles. Satellite imagery shows two launchers with their missiles raised into the vertical launch position, indicating a state of combat readiness. At the centre of the battery, the large mobile engagement radar is deployed, while a second tripod-mounted "Flap Lid" fire-control radar is visible at the northern end of the facility.
The latest Google Earth imagery from 2025 tells a markedly different story. The launchers, radars and associated support vehicles have all disappeared. The same absence of equipment is confirmed by imagery from the European Sentinel-2 satellite constellation taken in June and July 2026.
The evidence suggests that Russia's principal submarine-building complex has, at least temporarily, been left with only a limited number of shorter-range air-defence systems.
A possible clue
Where the S-300 and S-400 batteries from Severodvinsk have been redeployed remains unknown. One possible indication, however, comes from the fate of personnel from the 1528th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment who were killed during the war in Ukraine.
Among them was Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Spiridonov.
The 51-year-old officer from Severodvinsk is believed to have served as a battalion commander operating the S-400 system, according to TopCargo200, an open-source intelligence project that tracks senior Russian military personnel killed during the war.
Spiridonov was killed in occupied Crimea on 30 April 2024. On the same day, Reuters, citing Russian officials, reported that Ukrainian forces had launched strikes against air-defence positions on the peninsula. While Moscow acknowledged the attack, it did not report any military casualties.
In announcing his funeral, the local Telegram channel What's Happening in Severodvinsk [screenshot below] confirmed that Spiridonov had served with the 1528th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment and had been killed while carrying out duties in what the Kremlin describes as its "Special Military Operation".
His death provides a telling indication that personnel from the Severodvinsk-based regiment had been deployed far from Russia's High North. The cemetery where he was laid to rest lies barely 500 metres from the Mironov Hill air-defence position, where he is believed to have served before his regiment was sent to the war zone.
Ukraine has repeatedly targeted Russian S-300 and S-400 batteries in occupied Crimea.
Following these strikes, Western intelligence assessments suggested that Russia would need to replace destroyed or damaged systems by transferring batteries from other military districts rather than relying solely on new production. As a result, S-300 and S-400 units have reportedly been redeployed from areas considered to face a lower threat—including parts of the Russian Far East, the Arctic and around major naval bases—to reinforce air defences in western Russia and occupied Ukraine.
The redeployment of air-defence systems from regions previously regarded as relatively secure is not unique to Severodvinsk. An investigation by the independent journalism collective Bellingcat in late 2023 concluded that S-400 batteries had been transferred from Kaliningrad to Rostov-on-Don and other locations closer to the front line.
Russia forced to make difficult choices
Kristian Åtland, an expert on Russian naval operations in the High North and the war in Ukraine, says there are growing indications that Russia is running short of both air-defence launchers and interceptor missiles for systems such as the S-300 and S-400.
"Trying to fend off Ukraine's drone and missile strikes against strategic infrastructure deep inside Russian territory, Russia is burning through its interceptor missile stockpiles faster than the defence industry can replace them. This has apparently forced the Kremlin to reallocate many of its air-defence assets from lower-priority regions to higher-priority areas, such as Moscow, St Petersburg and operational zones closer to the Ukrainian front, including Crimea."
Åtland cautions, however, that the apparent disappearance of the systems from satellite imagery does not necessarily mean that the Arkhangelsk region or the Severodvinsk shipyards have been left without air-defence cover.
"The systems shown on earlier satellite imagery may have been dispersed, undergoing maintenance or replaced by other air-defence assets. The apparent disappearance of S-300 or S-400 launchers is probably the result of a temporary redeployment rather than a permanent withdrawal, and the assets may be returned to their original sites once operational requirements elsewhere have been met."
Per Erik Solli, Senior Military Adviser at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), believes Ukraine has succeeded in creating an operational dilemma for Russia.
"Ukrainian forces have demonstrated the ability to strike targets both deep inside Russian territory and along the front line. The geographical scope of these operations is now so extensive that Russia lacks the resources to defend every potential target within range of Ukrainian weapons. This likely forces Moscow to make difficult choices about where to concentrate its air defences and where it must accept greater risk."
According to Solli, protecting major population centres has become the priority.
"The emphasis is likely to be on defending Moscow, St Petersburg and other strategically important urban areas in order to minimise both military and psychological consequences."
Last week, Ukrainian drones struck Russia's largest oil refinery in the West Siberian city of Omsk, roughly 2,500 kilometres from the Ukrainian border.
Severodvinsk lies approximately 1,500 kilometres from Ukrainian-controlled territory, placing it within the potential range of both long-range drones and cruise missiles.
Åtland nevertheless considers it unlikely that Ukraine would deliberately target Russia's submarine-building facilities.
"So far, Ukraine has not conducted any known strikes against Russia's nuclear submarine fleet or the nuclear shipbuilding facilities at Severodvinsk. By contrast, air bases such as Olenya have played a much more direct role in Russia's war against Ukraine and have therefore been regarded as more likely targets for Ukrainian drone strikes."
That assessment is borne out by recent events.
On 1 June last year, a swarm of explosive-laden quadcopters was launched from a concealed compartment in the roof of a Russian lorry parked a few kilometres from Olenya Air Base, south of Murmansk. The drones destroyed four strategic bombers and damaged four others.
The operation, codenamed Spiderweb by Ukraine, is widely regarded as one of the most sophisticated and successful attacks on Russian military infrastructure since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.
Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya Air Base have repeatedly participated in the war by launching cruise-missiles at civilian targets in Ukraine.